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Abstract 
Existing studies of the political determinants of top incomes and inequality tend to 
focus on developments within individual countries, neglecting the role of potential 
interdependencies that transcend national borders.  This article argues that the 
sharp rises in top incomes around the world in recent years are in part a product of 
specific features of the US political economy, which were subsequently exported to 
other economies through the global expansion of US-based financial investors.  To 
test the argument, we collect fine-grained micro-level data on executive pay and firm 
ownership structures for a comprehensive sample of publicly listed firms in the 
United Kingdom (UK). Our analyses uncover robust evidence that the 
Americanization of UK firm ownership leads to sizable pay increases for high-level 
managers at those firms. Scrutinizing the causal mechanisms underlying this effect, 
we find them to be more consistent with changes in executive bargaining power than 
market-related factors such as skills premia or better corporate performance. The 
findings have important implications for the literature on the international political 
economy of inequality. 
Keywords: Inequality – winner-takes-all – foreign investments – top incomes – 
corporate governance 
JEL Code: A1, C1 
Introduction 
Income inequality, and the trend towards increasing concentration of income and 
wealth at the top of the distribution, have become a major cause for concern in both 
scholarly and public debate. Researchers have documented the growing share taken 
by the wealthiest households in the United States, with the top one per cent currently 
capturing as high a share of income as in the 1920s (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 
2010). The Occupy movement’s popularization of the concept of the ‘one per cent’ in 
the US has articulated this concern in the public sphere. Research on the causes of 
this sharp rise in top income shares have invoked factors such as the rising capital 
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share (Piketty 2014), the growing political power of the wealthy (Hacker and Pierson 
2010), technological change (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014), the decline of trade 
unions (Huber, Huo, and Stephens 2017; Hager 2018), and financialization (Flaherty 
2015). 
The dominant ontology adopted by analyses in this substantial body of research has 
approached the study of inequality as primarily a national-level phenomenon. This 
article puts forward a different, complementary perspective. It emphasizes the 
transnational dimension of these developments. To an important extent, we argue, 
the dramatic income gains of individuals populating the top one per cent in recent 
years result from a growing upwards-distribution of corporate profits within large 
multinational companies. This, we suggest, makes firms as sites of redistributive 
struggles fruitful units of analysis to better understand the determinants of global 
trends towards greater inequality.  
Empirically, we depart from aggregate data on national-level top income shares. 
Instead we analyze individual manager-level remuneration using fine-grained micro-
level data on executive pay. For reasons of data quality we focus on companies that 
are publicly listed in the jurisdiction with the most stringent transparency 
requirements on executive pay outside the USA, the United Kingdom (UK). The data 
we use covers several thousand high-level managers of UK-incorporated firms from 
2007 throughout 2014. This enables us to study in detail the micro-dynamics driving 
variations in rewards for the highly paid executives that populate the top percentile of 
the income distribution. In contrast to the emphasis on national-level institutional 
features in the previous literature, we are particularly interested in examining an 
alternative potential channel of an explicitly transnational nature: the 
internationalization – and more specifically the Americanization – of ownership of 
non-US firms. 
Whilst trends towards a growing concentration of incomes have been a widespread 
phenomenon, nowhere have these developments been more dramatic than in the 
United States (“WID” 2018). As other studies have shown (Bebchuk and Fried 2004; 
Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005), these trends in the American economy have to an 
important extent been driven by a shift from cash-based salaries towards equity-
based “pay-for-performance” (P4P) remuneration schemes promoted by advocates 
of the shareholder value model. Our empirical analyses assess the extent to which 
the global spread of US-based investors may have contributed to the diffusion of 
such American-style remuneration practices – and by implication greater income 
inequality – in the British economy. Our findings provide strong and robust evidence 
that this has indeed been the case: as US ownership in UK-incorporated firms 
grows, pay for top executives at those firms goes up significantly. 
The fine-grained nature of our data allows us to also evaluate various mechanisms 
that may lie behind this outcome. We draw a distinction between two sets of 
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mechanisms: market-related factors, such as changes in the demand and supply of 
certain skills or the productivity impact of performance-related compensation 
structures; and a more political explanation revolving around changes in bargaining 
power within the firm, for example the ability of executives to use new compensation 
structures to redistribute a larger share of firm resources to themselves. Our results 
are most consistent with the latter interpretation. In other words, our findings suggest 
that the entry of US investors enables top executives at UK-based firms to employ 
strategies that enable them to benchmark themselves to highly-paid US peers, and 
thereby capture ever larger shares of corporate profits even in the absence of 
improvements in corporate performance. 
Our focus on firms based in only one country poses natural limitations on the 
external validity of our findings. On the one hand, trade unions and other corporatist 
arrangements are known to be weak in the UK, and it is possible that they still act as 
stronger barriers to upwards pressures on executive pay in other environments. On 
the other hand, our finding that US influence has had a strong impact even in a 
country featuring a business culture considered similar to the one in the USA could 
equally suggest that the disruptive potential of American ownership may be even 
greater elsewhere. In either case, the size and robustness of the effects that we find 
in the UK case are large enough to make further research on both the impact of US 
owners as well as the ability of institutions of corporate governance to resist these 
pressures a seemingly worthwhile undertaking. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature on 
inequality and top income shares, elaborates our argument and examines possible 
channels for diffusion. Section three presents the empirical strategy and data, 
section four the empirical analyses, and section five concludes. 
The politics of inequality in a global economy: conceptual 
framework 
Most political science research on income inequality has focused on the gap 
between the lower and middle income groups, emphasizing the role of electoral 
institutions  (Lijphart 1999; Iversen and Soskice 2006), partisan control of 
government (Cusack 1997; Bartels 2008; Iversen and Soskice 2009), welfare state 
arrangements (Esping-Andersen 1990), and the strength and coordination of labor 
representation (Hall and Soskice 2001; Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Thelen 2014; 
Martin and Swank 2012).  
But more recently, the pioneering data collection efforts of Anthony Atkinson, 
Thomas Piketty and their collaborators (Atkinson and Piketty 2007, 2010) and the 
phenomenal success of Piketty’s interpretation of this data in his Capital in the 
Twenty-First Century (Piketty 2014) has given rise to a new field of research 
focusing on the politics of inequalities at the top of the income distribution (Hopkin 
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and Lynch 2016; Hager 2018). One influential stream of work in this area explains 
the concentration of income in the USA as the result of successful ‘organized 
combat’ by wealthy and corporate interests who use their financial clout to skew 
policy in their favor (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Gilens 2012). Another stream of 
research evaluates the role of institutional arrangements in explaining cross-national 
variations in top income shares through cross-country regression analyses (Scheve 
and Stasavage 2009; Huber, Huo, and Stephens 2017). 
From nation-states to firms 
Ontologically, this existing body of research shares a focus on nation-states as key 
analytical units. Pursuing this line of inquiry, the literature has made important 
contributions to our understanding of the political drivers of growing income 
inequality. But a focus on nation-states alone, as seminal literature in IR has 
highlighted for many other policy issues (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Gilardi 2012; 
Farrell and Newman 2014; Oatley 2011; Bauerle Danzman, Oatley, and Winecoff 
2017), risks overlooking transnational drivers of outcomes of interest.  
Furthermore, there are good reasons to think that the transnational is of relevance 
for the study of top income inequality. As in-depth studies of US (Bakija, Cole, and 
Heim 2012) and UK (Brewer, Sibieta, and Wren-Lewis 2009) tax records show, the 
‘top one per cent’ are predominantly salaried managers and finance professionals – 
social groups who live in deeply transnational environments (especially in the 
‘Anglosphere’). In this sense, the study of income inequality at the top through the 
use of cross-national country-level regression analyses may face some inherent 
limitations. 
In this article we therefore propose shifting the primary unit of analysis from the 
national level at the aggregate to the level of firms. This shift is justifiable in particular 
when we consider that whilst pre-war inequality was fuelled by extreme 
concentrations of capital income, growth in inequality today is overwhelmingly the 
result of differences in labor incomes – the growing gap between stagnating median 
wages and the “explosion of supermanager salaries“ (Piketty, 2014: 334). 
Redistributive struggles centered on the wage-setting process, which plays out at the 
level of firms (Avent-Holt and Tomaskovic-Devey 2014), thus arguably play a key 
role in determining patterns of inequality in the contemporary period. In our analysis 
we thus conceptualize (multinational) corporations as key sites of redistributive 
struggles that shape broader trends of inequality in the global economy. The 
transnational dynamic that we are particularly interested in is whether the 
Americanization of corporate ownership leads to higher levels of executive pay in 
non-US firms. 
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US capitalism and the revolution in executive pay 
The starting point of our analysis is the uncontroversial fact that the United States 
has been at the forefront of the rise in top incomes amongst the advanced 
economies. In addition to the aggregate data reported in Piketty (2014), studies have 
also specifically documented the rise in rewards for top managers in the US. 
Although the US has long had higher levels of inequality than most of Europe, the 
income shares of America’s high earners have varied over time. As Frydman and 
Saks (2010) have documented, levels of executive pay in the USA increased only 
incrementally from the mid-1940s to the 1970s, but then started to grow increasingly 
rapidly in the 1980s. In the 1990s and early 2000s the ratio of the average salary of 
the CEO of a large listed American company compared to the average worker 
reportedly grew from 42:1  (in 1980) to 347:1 (in 2016) (Hargreaves 2019, 7). 
As business historians and management scholars have shown, these sharp 
increases in pay are closely related to the rise of the shareholder value ideology in 
the 1980s and an associated change in the way in which executives were paid 
(Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). In the view of many 
financial economists and regulators, managers (the ‘agents’) had become too 
powerful and enjoyed too much freedom to pursue their own goals rather than those 
of the owners of the company (the ‘principals’). To realign incentives, proponents of 
the shareholder value approach - led by activist institutional investors who “saw 
themselves (…)  as the shock troops of shareholder primacy” (Buchanan, Chai, and 
Deakin 2012, 6) - advocated a move towards a greater use of equity-based pay (i.e. 
to remunerate high-level executives with stock of their own company rather than 
cash). This was seen as an effective way to assure that managers will act in 
shareholders’ best interests and focus on increasing firms’ market value.1  
As others have suggested (Thomas 2004; Conyon, Core, and Guay 2011; 
Fernandes et al. 2013), the move towards a pay-for-performance culture in the USA 
was accompanied by sharp increases in executives’ total remuneration for two 
reasons. First, it legitimized higher pay since it could now be justified as being a 
meritocratic award and desirable incentive for managers to do the ‘right’ thing (i.e. 
increase firm’s share price). Even spectacular increases in remuneration could be 
justified by commensurate improvements in corporate performance and the delivery 
of high financial returns to shareholders. Second, compared to standard 
remuneration in cash, the value of equity-based remuneration is less transparent and 
thus easier to conceal, removing fears about a potential backlash by shareholders or 
the public about perceived excesses in managers’ pay.  
The increases in executive pay in US companies in the 1980s-2000s are 
unparalleled in other parts of the world. One of the first studies comparing executive 
                                                          
1
 See for instance the Harvard Business Review manifesto for P4P by Jensen and Murphy (1990). 
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pay data internationally found that the pay differential between CEOs in the USA and 
UK was nearly 200 percent, and even larger in comparison to most other advanced 
economies (Conyon and Murphy 2000). More recent studies in the field of executive 
compensation have attempted to explain this international pay gap. According to 
their findings some of it can be accounted for by the larger size of US firms, their 
better economic performance, and a more widespread dilution of corporate 
ownership  (Cheffins and Thomas 2004; Conyon, Core, and Guay 2011; Fernandes 
et al. 2013). Yet, even if such factors are being taken into account, a sizable ”US 
premium” remains (Fernandes et al. 2013). 
Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon using our own data on executive remuneration, 
comparing developments in the USA and UK.2 The graph plots the annual 
remuneration of the median executive of the median company in terms of pay in the 
USA (black lines) and UK (grey lines). To improve comparability3 we restrict the 
sample to very large companies with at least 10,000 employees. Both the pay gap 
and the increase in total pay over the time period are remarkable: the pay package 
granted to the median executive in the US in the year 2000 was worth more than $8 
million in inflation-adjusted 2017 USD and – in disregard of the occurrence of two 
major financial crises in 2001 and 2007 - grew gradually to $15 million by 2014. In 
the UK, median pay at similarly large companies was significantly lower at less than 
$1 million at the beginning of the period. But it tripled to more than $3 million in 2014, 
reducing the pay gap faced by UK executives from an eighth to a (still significant) 
quarter of their US peers. 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Note that in global perspective the UK is considered to be one of the highest-paying markets other 
than the US, together with Switzerland, Ireland, Italy, Australia and Canada (Fernandes et al. 2013, 
337;344).  
3
 The BoardEx data for the UK has better coverage and includes many smaller firms than data for the 
USA. 
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SOURCE: Own calculations based on BoardEx data. NOTE: For better readability the y-axis is in logarithmic 
scale. Lines show the value of the annual salary of the median executive in the median firm in the country-
sample. All values are in constant 2017 USD. To improve cross-country comparability, country samples are 
restricted to very large companies with at least 10,000 employees. Further details on the underlying data is 
provided in Table A1 and Table A2 in the appendix.  
In brief: there are strong indications that executive salaries are exceptionally high in 
the USA and that their growth was driven, to an important extent, by the rise to 
prominence of the shareholder primacy maxim and an increasing reliance on P4P 
and equity-based pay. Arguably these developments were in the first place the result 
of political trends in the United States. The effects thereof, however, we suggest, 
may have reverberated far beyond its national borders. Once established in the 
United States, these remuneration practices could be spread to other parts in the 
world, through different possible routes, affecting income distributions around the 
world. The next section assesses some hypotheses about the possible nature of this 
diffusion. 
Potential mechanisms of diffusion 
In the contemporary world economy, Wall Street remains the core of the global 
financial system and US-based investors own significant shares of corporations 
around the world (Fichtner 2017; Starrs 2013). While US investors directly control 
some publicly listed foreign companies in which they own more than 50 percent of 
corporate shares, the more common picture (illustrated in appendix Table A5) is the 
one of US institutional investors owning substantial minority positions ranging 
between 1 and 20 percent of large listed foreign-incorporated outstanding stock. This 
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does not grant them managerial control over those companies, but it does make 
them potentially influential stakeholders. 
The process determining the pay packages that top managers receive involves 
several actors (Hargreaves 2019, 10–12): It is centered around a firm-internal 
remuneration committee, which is typically constituted by several members of the 
board of directors. The committee usually seeks the advice of external compensation 
consultants4 and agrees on a recommended pay package in cooperation with the 
firm’s HR Department. Depending on national corporate governance laws, the 
recommendation then has to be formally approved at the annual shareholder 
meeting through an advisory or binding vote. 
This setup opens up a variety of potential mechanisms through which larger 
ownership stakes by US-based investors could translate into upwards pressures on 
executive pay at non-US firms. We structure them into two distinct types: market 
mechanisms (such as supply and demand for skills and rewards for productivity), 
and political mechanisms (such as shifts in bargaining power within the firm). 
Market Mechanisms: The first type of mechanisms relate to the logic of demand and 
supply in labour markets for top executives. The internationalization of corporate 
ownership structures may put a premium on top managers’ ability to interact and 
communicate effectively with investors from different cultural backgrounds. The extra 
skills that this demands (e.g. cross-cultural communication skills, a MBA degree from 
an internationally prestigious business school, etc.) may mean that the pool of 
potential candidates in a local job market shrinks as foreign investors become more 
prominent as shareholders, allowing qualified candidates to ask for higher 
remuneration (Oxelheim and Randoy 2005). Foreign investments in a company may 
also increase the likelihood to appoint external hires with an international reputation. 
This could lift salary upwards because, as argued by Rakesh Khurana (in Dillon 
2009), “with the emphasis on recruiting outside stars, the benchmarking [can] … 
become lateral” – that is, it can encourage remuneration committees to compare 
levels of pay to other top executives at other firms rather than lower-ranking directors 
of the same company. Growing influence from US investors specifically may equally 
increase the likelihood to appoint managers from the United States who will expect 
high levels of US-style pay. 
An alternative set of potential market mechanisms relates to US investors’ reportedly 
strong preference for P4P remuneration techniques. Since the profitability of their 
investments hinge on the stock market performance of target firms, advocates of 
P4P argue, shareholders should generously reward executives for improvements in 
performance, but sharply punish them for underperformance (Jensen and Murphy 
1990). Survey evidence suggests that these views are particularly widespread 
                                                          
4
 The leading providers are firms such as Towers Perrin, Mercer, Watson Wyatt, Hewitt Associates 
and New Bridge Street Consultants (Conyon, Peck, and Sadler 2009, 49). 
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among US institutional investors, with a majority of over two-thirds indicating the 
rigor of performance targets to be the single most important criterion when 
evaluating levels of pay (Morrow Sodali 2017, 20). To the extent that US investors 
insist more strongly on P4P than other shareholders, growing US investments may 
also lead to higher, equity-based pay provided that corporate performance is good. 
Bargaining Power. The second, more political set of mechanisms relate to the 
agency of executives themselves and their bargaining power within the firm. As 
proponents of managerial power theory in particular have pointed out, there are 
various ways through which executives themselves can influence their own pay. The 
two most important avenues are for managers to either take advantage of weak 
monitoring by independent directors on remuneration committees (Bebchuk and 
Fried 2004), or to influence the selection of peer groups in the latter’s benchmarking 
exercises (DiPrete, Eirich, and Pittinsky 2010; also Godechot 2017). Growing foreign 
ownership has the potential to facilitate both of these strategies. Domestic 
shareholders may be better able to monitor the actions of executives than US and 
other foreign ones. In this sense, agents (i.e. executives) may be able to appropriate 
greater shares of corporate profits for themselves without encountering resistance by 
the principals (i.e. shareholders) as ownership stakes pass from domestic to foreign 
investors. Simultaneously, the internationalization of corporate ownership may also 
be an opportunity for executives to push for a modification of remuneration 
committee’s all-important benchmarking exercises. As DiPrete et al. (2010, 1684) 
note, ‘aspiration peer groups will generally consist of highly paid peers, and CEOs 
have an obvious incentive to claim as highly paid a group of “peers” as possible’. In 
this sense, executives may see growing foreign ownership as an opportunity to 
argue that their salaries should be benchmarked to the earnings of international, 
rather than domestic or firm-internal, peers. In view of the sizable US pay premium, 
this should lead to particularly large effects if executives are able to claim American 
executives as the appropriate benchmark.  
Observable implications. Some of these mechanisms, such as the appointment of 
US citizens or the effects for the remuneration of incumbent as opposed to newly 
hired managers, we can observe directly in our data. Others entail observational 
implications that we can evaluate indirectly. To distinguish the relevance of market 
vs. political mechanisms generally, the relationship between pay and performance is 
key. Pay increases driven by improvements in corporate performance may point to 
the former, whilst increases in pay without improvements in performance may be 
indicative of the latter. To evaluate the relevance of skills-related factors as well as to 
adjudicate among the two main bargaining mechanisms, a comparison between the 
effects of US vs. non-US foreign investors and across industrial sectors can be 
useful. To the extent that key developments are related to skills or a weakening of 
the influence of domestic investors per se, effects should be similar for US and other 
foreign investments and across industrial sectors. If in contrast the effects are 
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significantly larger for US than other foreign owners or concentrated in industrial 
sectors in which levels of pay are particularly high in America (e.g. finance, cf. Lord 
and Saito 2010) benchmarking mechanisms would seem to be more prominent.  
In the sections that follow we examine these alternative hypotheses econometrically. 
Empirical strategy 
To assess the relationship between foreign ownership and executive pay in the 
United Kingdom and the mechanisms that may be underlying them, we collect 
detailed time-series panel data information on the yearly (pre-tax) remuneration of 
several thousand high-level executives at publicly listed UK-incorporate firms during 
the time period from 2007 to 2014.  
It is worth noting that we are not the first to investigate the effects of the 
Americanization of European companies. Business historians have provided rich 
accounts of European firms’ adoption (and adaptation) of technologies, 
organizational structures and managerial practices used by US multinationals in the 
post-war era (Zeitlin and Herrigel 2000; Almond et al. 2006). A small number of 
studies in the management and finance literature has also investigated the effects of 
Americanization on CEO compensation in Canada (Sapp 2008; Southam and Sapp 
2010), Norway and Sweden (Oxelheim and Randoy 2005), the United Kingdom 
(Gerakos, Piotroski, and Srinivasan 2013), and a cross-national European sample 
(Fernandes et al. 2013). Empirically, our research departs from these studies in 
three ways. 
First, our sample is more comprehensive than those of previous studies, covering a 
consistent time period of 8 years5, and including salary information of several top 
executives of the same firm (instead of only CEOs). This makes our sample more 
representative, and at the same time enables us to employ regression modeling 
techniques (e.g. panel regressions with firm fixed effects), which allow us to assess 
these relationships in a more rigorous manner. 
Second, a majority of the few existing studies operationalized Americanization 
through variables that measure outcomes of decisions of the executives themselves 
- e.g. a cross-listing in the US, the appointment of an American national to the board 
of directors or sales in the US market. This makes it difficult to evaluate whether 
executives actively seek exposure to US capital markets because they see it as a 
means to justify a push for larger pay packages (in which case executives’ quest for 
higher pay would cause Americanization), or if it is the exposure to the US itself that 
enables them to increase their pay (in which case Americanization causes higher 
pay). In comparison to these proxies, US ownership is further removed from 
decisions adopted by managers themselves. Since shares of publicly listed 
                                                          
5
 Gerakos, Piotroski, and Srinivasan (2013) used data from 2002-2007; the main results of all other 
studies rely on cross-sectional analyses from only one year. 
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companies are traded on open markets, company directors exercise little influence 
over the buyers/sellers of their equity. As Gerald Davis (2008, 17) notes, ‘[m]any 
corporate executives may only learn … [who] is their largest shareholder when they 
find out about it through a securities filing by the fund’. The relative exogeneity of the 
ownership variable arguably make it better suited to study the effects of 
Americanization on executive pay.6 
Finally, we are not only interested in establishing the existence of a relationship 
between US ownership and executive pay. The richness of our dataset also allows 
us to more systematically evaluate the relevance of various different possible causal 
mechanisms theorized in the preceding section. 
Data  
 
Our sample focuses on publicly listed UK-incorporated firms in the period from 2007 
to 2014. The relevant British government regulations setting the framework for 
executive pay during our time period of observation are the UK Corporate 
Governance Code and the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations, both issued 
in 2002 (Petrin 2015; Bender and Moir 2006). The legislation does not impose any 
cap on levels of pay, but requires publicly listed firms to make detailed information on 
the remuneration of top executives publicly available. It also subjects remuneration 
reports to an advisory ”say-on-pay” vote at annual shareholder meetings. 
Our data on executive pay is from BoardEx, a London-based business intelligence 
firm that collects data on the remuneration, network and career trajectory of over one 
million high-level executives around the world.7 BoardEx does not employ an explicit 
sampling methodology, the collection of data being driven by availability and ‘client 
interest’.8 Information on executive pay at publicly listed firms9 is collected 
predominantly from companies’ annual reports. The data is widely used for academic 
research in finance and business studies and our cross-checking of randomly 
selected data points with original figures in annual reports found the information to 
be reasonably accurate.  
To evaluate the coverage of our data we compared the number of companies with 
executive remuneration data with the total number of companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange (the only remaining UK stock market) in the same year. As 
illustrated in appendix Table A3, more than half of all publicly listed UK-incorporated 
firms are included in the BoardEx dataset and information on executive pay is 
available for about 40 percent of the entire population of companies. The mean 
                                                          
6
 Fernandes et al. (2013) is the only other study which has used this information, but with a 
comparably small sample for only one year. 
7
 We downloaded the entire database in the summer of 2016. 
8
 Personal communication with BoardEx. 
9
 BoardEx also collects some information on some notable firms that are held privately, but we restrict 
our analysis to publicly listed firms. 
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market capitalization of companies in our dataset is three to four times larger than 
the average of all LSE-listed firms, suggesting that, unsurprisingly, the data is 
skewed towards larger firms. The market value of all companies with remuneration 
data combined lies well above 90 percent of the value of all UK-incorporated 
companies listed on the LSE.10 In brief: although we do not observe executive pay 
for the entire population of firms, we are confident that the data covers a substantial 
part of relevant companies and captures developments in large publicly listed firms 
in the United Kingdom in a broadly representative manner. 
Data on corporate ownership, the key independent variable for our study, is from 
Bureau van Dijk’s (BvD) Orbis database. BvD is one of the largest providers of 
corporate data. Independent assessments have found the quality of the data to be 
good and coverage for the UK is nearly complete for companies employing more 
than 50 employees (Garcia-Bernardo and Takes 2016, 4). 
The identification of the owners of publicly listed corporations faces two challenges: 
First, only relatively large investors whose holdings exceed a certain threshold are 
legally obliged to declare their ownership stakes. The precise threshold depends on 
the applicable regulation which varies by type of investor and investee, but generally 
ranges between 1 and 5 percent of a company’s outstanding stock11. By implication, 
available ownership data will be biased towards relatively large investors and 
positions by small investors will frequently remain unidentified. Given that nearly 90 
percent of shares in the UK stock market are held by institutional investors (Office for 
National Statistics 2017) and that the focus of our theoretical argument is on 
investors large enough to influence managerial decision-making, this does not 
constitute a major problem for our research. But it is a limitation that should be borne 
in mind. Second, investment flows in globalized capital markets are commonly 
channeled through several jurisdictions. As a result, ownership relations in the 
contemporary economy are frequently opaque (Linsi and Mügge 2019). A key 
strength of the Orbis ownership data in this respect is BvD’s development of a 
proprietary methodology aimed at estimating shareholders’ total ownership stakes, 
including both direct and indirect positions. To identify total ownership stakes, BvD 
leverages their database’s archive of over 300 million observed ownership links, 
which enable it to track down the beneficial owners of indirect positions as long as all 
nodes in the ownership chain are included (Bureau van Dijk 2018). Furthermore, 
ultimate ownership positions can be validated by cross-checking records filed with 
regulatory agencies on both ends of the ownership chain. Although it remains clear 
                                                          
10
 Missing data and the volatility of stock prices and exchange rates complicate the comparison of the 
market cap between datasets, meaning that these estimates are only rough approximations. 
11
 According to current UK regulations, any investor interested to acquire a share of 1 percent or more 
is legally obliged to inform the target company; in cases of 3 percent or more, investors must in addition 
inform the London Stock Exchange (Marriage 2015). Outward investors domiciled in the USA must 
simultaneously declare substantial ownership positions to the SEC through 13F and 13D declarations, 
which are made publicly available on the Edgar system.  
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that unavoidably some ownership positions will be missed or misattributed, we 
believe the ownership data to be reliable for stakes held by large institutional owners 
who are subject to strict legally mandated declaration obligations. 
To operationalize US and other foreign ownership of publicly listed UK-incorporated 
firms we calculate the aggregate value of all positions of ultimate owners domiciled 
in the USA or any other foreign country as identified in the Orbis database. Summary 
statistics are provided in appendix Table A4. They indicate that on average about 50 
percent of the shares of publicly listed UK-incorporated firms are owned by foreign 
investors,12 of which approximately a fifth are being held by investors domiciled in 
the United States.  
Who are the investors behind these aggregate figures? To find out, we took an in-
depth look at the Orbis data to identify the largest shareholders present in the UK 
stock market. For purposes of illustration, appendix Error! Reference source not 
found. lists the ten largest shareholders by country of domicile - distinguishing 
between investors from the USA, any foreign country other than USA and domestic 
investors from the UK - for the years 2007 and 2015. Without exception, they are 
institutional investors:  investment banks (e.g. Goldman Sachs, UBS, JP Morgan 
Chase or Société Générale), mutual and exchange-traded funds (e.g. Blackrock or 
Vanguard), insurers (f.e. Legal and General, Prudential or Standard Life) as well as 
one sovereign wealth fund (Norges Bank). Importantly for our analysis, there is no 
obvious difference in the composition of groups of US and other foreign investors. 
Both primarily capture large mutual funds.  
Econometric analyses 
Our econometric strategy unfolds in three steps. First, we run a set of standard panel 
fixed-effects regressions with firms as units of observations to evaluate the 
association between marginal increases in US and non-US foreign ownership and 
individual pay packages disbursed to executives at UK-incorporated firms. We then 
exploit the individual-level data to validate these results, address alternative 
explanations, and explore the relevance of various diffusion mechanisms. Finally, as 
a robustness check, we confirm our results in a sample restricted to the executive 
directors for which we have longitudinal information.   
Company-level analysis 
 
We first estimate the relationship between foreign ownership and executive pay at 
                                                          
12
 This estimate is very similar to the results of a recent study on foreign ownership of the UK stock 
market commissioned by the ONS. Tracking ultimate owners for a subsample of 200 listed UK 
companies in 2015, the report indicated levels of foreign ownership to amount to 53.9% (Office for 
National Statistics 2017). 
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the company-level. Using our sample13, we estimate the following baseline 
specification: 𝑌𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1. 𝑆𝑗,𝑡 +𝑊′𝑗,𝑡. 𝜆2 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜂𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜈𝑗,𝑡  (1) 
where j indicates companies, and t years. Yj,t  measures the median remuneration of 
executives (in log) at a given firm in year t. 𝑆𝑗,𝑡 refers to the percentage of a 
company’s shares that are foreign-owned, and 𝜆1 is the main parameter we are 
interested in estimating. Wj,t is a vector of company covariates including nominal 
stock price variation, the solvency ratio, BvD’s ownership concentration index 
proxying for management independence, as well as union density at the level of the 
industrial sector companies operate in. 𝜇𝑗 are company-fixed effects, which absorb 
the influence of any characteristics that are constant within firms over time, such as 
internal culture or industrial branch. Year-fixed effects 𝛿𝑡 control for macroeconomic 
shocks affecting all firms simultaneously in a year, and sector-specific linear time 
trends 𝜂𝑠,𝑡 capture heterogeneous trends in managerial pay across industrial sectors. 
νj,t is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. Descriptive 
statistics can be found in appendix Table A6. 
The identification assumption one needs to make to interpret our results causally is 
the absence of any firm-specific shocks that correlate with both pay packages and 
ownership structures. Company-fixed effects and year effects remove the influence 
of firm-idiosyncratic factors and over-time developments common to all firms. Sector-
trends account for the different trajectories economic sectors might be following. 
Company time-varying covariates aim at controlling for additional company-specific 
characteristics that may jointly affect remuneration and ownership. Despite the use 
of this fairly extensive set of fixed effects and controls, we cannot rule out the 
possible existence of unobserved factors, which may bias our results. Taking this 
identification threat into account, we perform numerous robustness checks designed 
to address some of these potential concerns.  
Before turning to our econometric analyses, we examine the bivariate relationship 
between the log of firm-median executive remuneration and foreign ownership. 
Figure 2 plots the relationship of pay with US-held shares on the left, and with non-
US foreign investor-held shares on the right. 
                                                          
13
 We drop companies we only observe once since we estimate panel fixed effects regressions.  
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The plots indicate a clear positive relationship between US investor presence and 
executive pay. The relationship appears to be fairly linear, lending support to our 
baseline specification modelling assumptions. The association between executive 
remuneration and non-US ownership is also positive, but clearly weaker - a pattern a 
priori more consistent with either benchmarking or performance-related mechanisms 
at the expense of skill factors or weaker monitoring. 
In our regression analyses we probe the robustness of these associations. We first 
examine the association between firm-median executive pay and total foreign 
ownership (i.e. US- and non-US foreign-held shares combined). The first three 
columns in Table 1 model a linear relationship between our variables of interest. The 
last three a non-linear one, in which we use a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
companies that have significant foreign investments. Following Davis ( 2008, 16ff.), 
as well as international statistical standards that define positions above 10 percent 
as foreign direct (rather than portfolio) investments (International Monetary Fund 
2014), we set the critical threshold at 10 percent. While this threshold is admittedly 
somewhat arbitrary, the advantage of this setup is that it is on the whole less 
sensitive to potential measurement errors in the ownership variable. In either case, 
consistent results across the two models would increase our confidence in the 
findings.  
Moving from left to right, we gradually introduce more covariates in order to assess 
how the removal of potential sources of confounding variation affects our results. In 
Column 1, we only include company and year fixed effects. The correlation between 
foreign ownership and pay is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient 
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implies that each 10 percentage points increase in foreign ownership is associated 
with 1.1 percent increase in executive pay. Adding sector linear trends in Column 2 
doesn’t affect these results much. In Column 3 we also control for company 
covariates. The coefficient remains positive and the point estimate is barely affected 
by the introduction of covariates, but it turns insignificant due to increases in the 
standard errors.14 In Columns 4 to 6, we report the results for the 10 percent 
ownership dummy. The coefficients estimated are stable as we introduce controls 
and suggest that all else equal, firms with significant foreign ownership pay their top 
executive directors approximately 10 percent more than similar domestically owned 
firms. 
 
In Table 2Error! Reference source not found. we separate US investors from other 
foreign investors. The table is structured in the same fashion as the previous one. In 
line with our theoretical argument, we find a strongly positive and statistically 
significant coefficient for the US ownership continuous measure throughout the first 
three columns. The estimates are significant at the 1 percent level. They indicate a 
10 percentage point increase in US ownership to translate into a substantial pay 
increase for top executives at British firms of approximately 4 percentage points. At 
                                                          
14
 Since we have some missing observations for those controls, we operate with a smaller sample. In 
addition, some of those variables may be ‘bad controls’ in the sense that they are possibly affected 
directly by ownership structures. In consequence, we don’t necessarily view our results in Column 3 
as our preferred ones. 
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the same time, the association between continuous non-US foreign ownership 
measure and pay is statistically insignificant once that the US-related component is 
separated out. It does remain significant in the dummy approach (presented in 
columns 4 to 6). But the size of the effect and the level of statistical significance are 
higher for US investors also in these models.  
 
 
The results presented so far are based on an unbalanced panel of firms. In appendix 
Table A7 we check our results with a balanced sample of firms for which we have 
observations in every year. The results are strongly consistent with the previous 
results. Furthermore, we also evaluate the robustness of our results when we use 
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the log of the company-mean instead of -median remuneration as the dependent 
variable. As shown in appendix Table A8, again the results remain consistent.15  
Next we examine the industry heterogeneity of this relationship. In Table 3  we re-
estimate equation 1 but split our sample of firms into five broad economic sectors: 
financial services and real estate, non-financial services, primary resources related, 
general industry, and high-tech.16 For each sector, we present results without 
covariates in the first step and then add company specific controls. We find that the 
presence of American investors has a positive effect on median remuneration across 
all ten columns of the table. But the effects are largest and statistically significant in 
only two sectors:  financial services and high-tech industries - precisely the two 
sectors that, in the US context, stand out for their exceptionally high levels of pay 
and use of equity-based pay incentives (cf. Lord and Saito 2010).17  
Both the difference in effects between US and non-US investors and these sectoral 
heterogeneities are not consistent with skills factors and weaker monitoring 
                                                          
15
 The positive estimates are slightly larger for models using the mean, which reflects the greater 
sensitivity of the mean than the median to extreme value observations. 
16
 Appendix  Error! Reference source not found. shows the industries included in each of these 
sectors. 
17
 Non-US foreign ownership has a negative association with remuneration in the financial services, 
primary resources, and high-tech sectors. The coefficients aren’t statistically significant, however. In 
contrast, a greater presence of non-American investors seems to have a positive and significant effect 
on the pay packages of directors employed in the non-financial services sector. 
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mechanisms, but in line with expectations of either performance-related market or 
benchmarking-related bargaining mechanisms.  
Next we probe the relationship between American ownership and the performance of 
the firms they invest in. In particular we are interested to know whether a greater 
influence of US-based investors leads to improvements in corporate performance, 
which we proxy with the use of three different measures: return on equity (a measure 
of short-term profitability), the solvency ratio (a measure of financial sustainability), 
and stock price variation (a measure of volatility and risk). We use simple models 
without company-covariates, but including sector linear trends. The results are 
presented in Table 4. On the whole, we do not find any solid evidence indicating that 
investments by US-based owners lead to improved financial results. The effect of US 
ownership percentages on solvency ratios is positive and significant at the 10 
percent level in column 1, but turns insignificant when we include sector trends  
(column 2). The effects on return on equity and stock price fluctuations in columns 3 
to 6 are insignificant and small throughout. In addition, also non-US foreign investors 
seem to have no visible effect on the solvency ratio or the stock price of the 
companies they invest in. Their presence is even negatively correlated with return on 
equity. In short, against the predictions of performance-related market mechanism, 
the positive relationship between American ownership and executive pay does not 
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appear to be mediated by actual improvements in the economic and financial 
performance of the firms they are investing in.  
Individual manager-level analysis 
In addition to the company-level analyses, the richness of our dataset allows us to 
carry out the analysis also at the level of individual managers. Doing so can 
contribute primarily two additional leverages to our investigation: it makes it possible 
to include additional individual-level control variables, which can help with precision. 
And it offers us opportunities to further explore potential channels of diffusion. 
Since the treatment of interest (American ownership of British companies) varies at 
the company-level, only time-varying variables measured at that same level can be 
potential sources of omitted variable bias. However, if it is the case that the 
composition of companies changes as a result of US investors’ acquisition of 
substantial ownership blocs in UK firms (for instance, if the number of directors per 
company changes as a result of incoming US investors’ influence over HR 
decisions), that would affect the interpretation of our results. Reassuringly, our 
findings at the level of individual managers strongly confirm the results from the 
company-level analysis: increases in US ownership have a sizable positive effect on 
the remuneration of UK-based top executives. In other words, our empirical analysis 
at the company level doesn’t suffer from aggregation issues. 
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With the switch from the company- to the individual manager-level our baseline 
specification changes to: 𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1. 𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑋′𝑖,𝑗,𝑡. 𝛽2 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜂𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  (2) 
where i denotes individual executive directors, j indicates companies, and t years. 
Yi,j,t  measures the remuneration of executives (in log). Xi,j,t is a vector of individual 
and company covariates (male dummy, age, age squared, US citizen dummy, 
solvency ratio, union density, stock price variation, BvD independence) and εi,j,t is the 
error term. The model includes company- and year-fixed effects as well as sector-
specific linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the company level. 
Descriptive statistics can be found in appendix Table A10. 
We begin the individual-level analysis by repeating the main empirical exercise from 
before at the further disaggregated level to test the relationship between foreign and 
US ownership and executive pay. The results are shown in Table 5Error! Reference 
source not found.. We only include individual-level covariates in columns 1 and 3; 
individual- as well as company-level controls in 2 and 4. The first two columns show 
results without, the latter two with sector time trends. Throughout all models we 
obtain positive and significant coefficients at the 5 percent level. The size of the 
effect is fairly stable and very close to the company-level estimate. According to our 
estimates in column 4, each 10 percentage point increase in American ownership is 
associated with a 3.9 percent increase in pay for top executives. The effect of non-
American foreign ownership is also positive, but much smaller and clearly statistically 
insignificant.  
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So far our analyses have focused on total pay as the outcome variable. Our dataset 
at the individual level in addition also allows us to study the effect of US ownership 
on the three distinct main components constituting executives’ total pay packages: 
cash salary, bonus, and equity. As we’ve argued above, to the extent that pay 
increases in the UK are the result of the adoption of US-style remuneration practices, 
the impact of growing US ownership should be particularly pronounced for the equity 
component of managers’ pay packages. This is the expectation that we test in the 
models presented in Table 6. We regress each one of the three remuneration 
components on both a limited (columns 1, 3 and 5) and extended (columns 2, 4 and 
6) set of covariates, controlling for sector trends. The findings strongly confirm our 
expectations: the effects of US ownership on salary and bonus are positive but 
insignificant at conventional levels of statistical significance. In contrast, our estimate 
of the effect on equity pay is large and statistically significant (independent of 
whether we include company-covariates or not).
  
Next we leverage the individual-level data to test the hiring of US nationals as a potential 
mechanism. As discussed, executive directors coming from the USA could plausibly ask for 
more generous pay packages because they are used to US-style levels of pay, and they 
may be offered more expensive remuneration deals by companies eager to attract them 
from the US market. To assess the relevance of this mechanism, we assess the impact of 
US ownership as a predictor of the probability that a manager has US nationality (coded as 
a dummy). A positive and significant coefficient on the ownership variable would suggest 
that American investments bring in US managers. Yet, this isn’t what we find. Although 
positive, US ownership coefficients in Table 7Error! Reference source not found. are 
very small in magnitude and insignificant. The hiring of American managers thus does not 
seem to be an important reason for the pay premium associated to US ownership that we 
observe. 
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In addition to the hiring of US nationals we also want to assess whether the US pay 
premium may be mediated by other selection effects, such as the hiring of new external 
managers (“outside hires” of any nationality) as a response to growing US ownership. To do 
so, we run a panel analysis with individual-manager level fixed effects. We first drop all 
managers that are observed only once in our sample. Then we re-run the baseline model 
specified in equation 2, but now additionally include director fixed effects 𝜃𝑖,. This design 
exploits variations in remuneration and exposure to American investors over time 
experienced by the same directors (i.e. those staying at the firm).18  
The results are shown in Table 8. In column 1 we first present coefficients obtained without 
covariates. Then we add time-varying company controls19  (column 2). The first two 
columns show models without, the latter two with sector linear time trends. Across all 
models, we find a positive relationship between US ownership and executive pay. The point 
estimates are imprecisely estimated in Columns 1 and 3. The coefficients in the second and 
fourth columns, which control for sector trends, are statistically significant at the 5 and 10 
percent levels respectively. Interestingly, the effect of non-American ownership is now also 
positive and significant. But the magnitude of the effect is substantially smaller, with the 
                                                          
18
 While remaining vulnerable to the potential source of omitted variable bias discussed earlier, it also enables 
us to remove potential director-idiosyncratic confounders. 
19
 Note that there isn’t enough variation to include director specific variables such as age or education given the 
panel structure of the dataset. 
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effect of additional investment from the USA being roughly three times as large as the one 
of non-US foreign investment. The finding that incumbent managers strongly benefit from 
foreign and US ownership provides evidence that the relationship is not simply driven by 
outside hiring. It is more consistent with mechanisms centered on the agency of local 
managers themselves. 
 
Discussion 
 
Our results show several interesting patterns. Throughout our analyses we have found a 
statistically significant and substantially large positive effect of US ownership on executive 
pay at publicly listed UK-incorporated firms. Investments from other non-US foreign 
investors are also associated with higher pay in some specifications, but both the statistical 
significance and substantive size of are comparatively smaller. We further found the pay 
effect of US-investments having been particularly strong in firms in the finance and high-
tech industries. These patterns go against the hypothesized mechanisms of extra skill 
requirements or weaker monitoring due to de-nationalization of firm ownership per se.  
We also find the US-induced pay premium to be strongly associated with larger shares of 
salary packages being tied to equity-based pay, but unrelated to corporate performance. 
Furthermore, we find no indication that US ownership increases the likelihood of 
appointments of US nationals at UK firms. Instead, we are able to show that incumbent 
managers benefit strongly from growing US ownership. These patterns highlight changes in 
how executives are being paid to be an important driver of the US pay premium. At the 
same time, the lack of a clear relationship with performance outcomes indicates that the 
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mechanism is driven more by changes in within-firm bargaining power than by changes in 
performance or market conditions.  
While the political sensitivity of pay-setting procedures at firms make it difficult to study 
these processes qualitatively20, the patterns in the data thus allow us making some 
informed guesses about how US investments lead to higher pay. In light of our findings that 
greater US ownership increases pay (and in particular its performance-related components) 
of incumbent managers without punishing them for bad outcomes, they appear to be driven 
not so much by US investors pushing for higher pay, but rather by local managers being 
able to leverage growing US ownership in order to legitimize higher pay for themselves. A 
plausible scenario that is consistent with our findings is that local managers take advantage 
of growing US ownership to push remuneration committees for a re-orientation towards 
highly paid US executives as the relevant peer group, which their pay shall be 
benchmarked to. This leads to a situation in which equity-based remuneration increases 
sharply for UK managers as it gradually catches up to US levels, while simultaneously 
shielding them from punishments for underperformance. 
Conclusions 
The rising share of income taken by the highest earners has become a source of great 
interest and concern, thanks to the pioneering work by Atkinson, Piketty and others. But the 
aggregate data reported in the World Incomes Database cannot be easily used to 
rigorously pinpoint the causes of rising top income shares. In this paper we have attempted 
to shed light on one of the main causes of this form of inequality, the dramatic increases in 
executive remuneration in many advanced nations, drawing on fine-grained individual- and 
company-level data which allow us to identify the specific causal channels of the emerging 
winner-take-all economy in the UK. 
We make three main contributions. First, we are able to show that adopting a firm-level 
perspective can yield valuable insights by stressing previously overlooked trans-national 
dimensions of worldwide growing income inequality. Second, we use granular data on the 
compensation packages of individual top executives in individual companies over several 
years to test the hypothesis that US investment is a key driver of skewed top income 
growth. The strength of our results gives us a high degree of confidence that, all else equal, 
US positions in UK companies bring increased rewards for top executives. Third, while not 
conclusive, the richness of our dataset also allows us to draw inferences about the 
dynamics through which US ownership leads to higher pay. Most importantly, the evidence 
that we assemble suggests that local managers play an important role as agents in these 
processes. In other words, growing US ownership does not primarily lead to higher pay 
because US investors push for it, but because – similar to Farrell and Newman’s (2014, 
347) conceptualization of ‘cross-national layering’ -  it creates opportunity spaces that local 
managers can exploit to appropriate greater shares of corporate profits for themselves. 
                                                          
20
 We were unable to find firms willing to share details about their pay-setting procedures with us. Executive 
pay consultants were equally reluctant to provide information or conduct research interviews. 
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At the same time, our focus on one country advises some caution in generalizing the 
findings, since we are unable to control for the effects of national-level variables such as 
corporate governance regulation, taxation policy, labour market and product market 
regulation, to name just a few potentially important factors that could affect how US 
investment feeds through into top income growth in different countries. 
Looking forward, future research could fruitfully extend the approach to other country cases 
to further probe the mechanisms and test how well our argument travels to different 
institutional and political environments. National institutional arrangements such as those 
that typically inform studies of economic inequality in the comparative political economy 
literature may have important effects in cushioning, diverting or perhaps even closing off the 
US investor channel to higher executive rewards. Due to growing pressures for 
transparency in executive pay, similar data as the one we used in this paper is slowly 
becoming available also for other European countries with different patterns of income 
distribution and different traditions of corporate governance and labour relations. By 
extending the analysis to more cases we can further advance our understanding of this key 
feature of contemporary advanced capitalism.  
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